Xinjiang ethnic groups united in hostility

The government in Xinjiang has been caught off guard by the anger it faces from its own people.

For decades its rulers brought in millions of people from China’s Han ethnic majority to colonise the ethnically diverse region in the country’s far west. They kept a wary eye on the Uighurs, the biggest local ethnic group, as the main security risk.

But since Wednesday it has been Han marching in the streets of Urumqi, the regional capital, calling for Wang Lequan, Xinjiang’s Communist party secretary, to step down.The protesters’ wrath was triggered by fear over reported syringe stabbing attacks which most attributed to the Uighurs . But the unfolding complaints about the government reflect much broader dissatisfaction across ethnic boundaries.“The central government may have put the economy first for the past 30 years but, in Xinjiang, stability has always been first and the economy is a distant second,” says a Han resident of Korla, a city in the region’s south. The 35-year-old resident asked not to be identified for fear of government retribution.“We shouldn’t be surprised that the Uighurs are making trouble. Even many Han are dissatisfied.”Many such complaints across all ethnic groups centre on Mr Wang.

Xinjiang is different from other Chinese provinces where local leaders rotate every few years. Mr Wang has held senior positions there since 1991 and headed the regional party committee for 15 years.

One of the most popular jokes among Xinjiang people is that while highway railings elsewhere need poles every three metres, Xinjiang needs one every metre “because Wang Lequan’s family produces them”.

While Mr Wang’s administration is determined to force rapid economic development, its approach has created a yawning income gap.

Until the mid-1990s, oil and gas exploration in Xinjiang was concentrated in the northern half of the region. But over the past decade PetroChina and other state-owned companies have begun to explore finds in the Taklamakan desert of southern Xinjiang.

In official propaganda, this benefits everyone. “Our strategy is to develop Xinjiang with large state-owned enterprises to make sure the development happens fast and on a large scale,” explains a documentary broadcast on Xinjiang television. “Thus we are creating new job opportunities, and we are raising incomes fast.”

But in reality most Uighurs are missing out because state-owned oil companies in Xinjiang prefer employing Han who speak Mandarin and are often more likely to bring technical skills than local Uighur farmers.

The wider public in Xinjiang shows discontent with rapid development as well. “They take our gas but they are giving nothing back,” is the most frequently heard complaint.

In general, tax revenues paid by a local branch of a central government-owned state enterprise should be split between the local and central governments.

But for the natural gas PetroChina sends through its pipelines, tax is paid at the other end, where it emerges in Shanghai.

That is where the subsidiary running the pipe-line is registered, according to a 2005 notice from the State Administration of Taxation.

Queries about PetroChina’s local tax payments were not answered by the Xinjiang government or the company.

In Xinjiang, natural gas is in short supply. In Aksu, midway between Urumqi and Kashgar, buses, taxis and private cars queue for half a kilometre in front of a natural gas station almost every day. Petrol and gas prices in the region are among the highest in all of China. And homes in most parts of Xinjiang, except for the biggest cities, burn coal or wood for heating because most of the region’s natural gas is sold to other provinces.

Xinjiang’s economy has been growing fast despite such bottlenecks. The region’s gross domestic product has been increasing at annual rates of 11-15 per cent over the past five years.

In Korla, where most oil companies set up their regional headquarters for Taklamakan exploration, gleaming black Porsche Cayennes and BMWs congregate on the sidewalks every night as oil engineers and other affluent migrants from other provinces enjoy the fruits of this boom.

Many feel left behind. A 35-year-old man complains that the rent he pays for the shop floor where he sells cheap accessories is more than 10 times the rent charged in a similar commercial area in Yiwu, a bustling coastal trading hub. “If this doesn’t get better soon, I’ll leave Xinjiang,” he says.

China’s lost files

Illustration by James Yang

On the day of his high school graduation in 1979, Zhu Zhuanghong saw a bright future for himself. People’s Bank of China had just picked the 19-year-old from among hundreds at his school to start work as a prestigious “cadre” candidate – an employee, in the Leninist language of Chinese institutions, set for a career as a professional. “My teacher told me that as a cadre at the bank, the wind cannot blow you over and the rain cannot hit you,” Mr Zhu recalls.

He was wrong. Now 50, Mr Zhu has been buffeted by the wind and rain for more than a decade. In 1995, he lost his job at Industrial and Commercial Bank of China , the world’s largest bank by market capitalisation, which had been spun off in 1984 from the central bank that had given him his first job.

The reason for this dramatic decline in fortunes is hidden in a manila folder in an office drawer somewhere in Beijing: Mr Zhu’s renshi danganor “employee file”. While China has long since replaced its communist economy with a kind of raw capitalism and is fast ascending to the rank of superpower, its relationship with its own citizens remains partly stuck in its totalitarian past. The state continues to keep a secret dossier on every working citizen, which helps it retain its absolute power over the individual.

The fate that Mr Zhu and an estimated hundreds of thousands of others – although there are no reliable records on exactly how many – have suffered under this system serves as a reminder of the limits of Beijing’s market reforms.

According to Mr Zhu, back in 1994 – following an argument with his supervisor at ICBC – crucial documentation proving his cadre status, higher than that of his “worker” colleagues, disappeared from his employee file, making him unemployable for other institutions and stripping him of part of the pension benefits he had earned.

After suing ICBC without result, Mr Zhu is now going after its shareholders in a Kafka-esque fight to uncover the truth about his own past and salvage what remains of his future.

For each of China’s 700m employees – except farmers, historically excluded – there is a file, started while they are high school students. The file is transferred to their employers, where it is open to superiors but closed to the employees themselves – which means, in effect, the state’s invisible hand can make or break anyone’s fate.

“The file system holds some functions that are covered by the social security number in the United States, but its real meaning is that it gives the state an instrument of control over the individual,” says Chen Tan, a professor of public policy at Central South university in Changsha.

The file is a leftover from before the market reforms that began 30 years ago, when all employers were state-owned “units”, and every individual was tied to one. The unit was in charge of every area of its employees’ lives – including cradle-to-grave care, political thinking and even marriages and births. The state no longer rules all aspects of life but the file system maintains power over individuals in case it is needed. That also leaves the door open to abuse.

Employee files are frequently filled with false information, and often used by superiors to punish staff they do not like or by state institutions to stop individuals taking politically sensitive ac tion, says Prof Chen, who has had access to thousands of such files for his research on the system.

Li Subin, a lawyer from Henan province, faced such abuse. In 2005, he moved to the capital and started work for Yitong, a law firm. But the Henan government refused to transfer his file to Beijing after a dispute between Mr Li and the authorities – whereupon the municipal government argued it could not renew his licence. Beijing authorities closed Yitong for six months, saying it was illegally employing Mr Li. Yitong was already a thorn in the government’s side as it had taken on politically sensitive cases.

Mr Li turned to courts in both Henan and Beijing, but neither solved his problem. In Henan, where he sued the local justice department, judges told him the file transfer was a problem with the Beijing justice department and refused to become involved. In Beijing, where he tried to drag both departments into court, his complaint was rejected. “All that is only possible because the file system exists,” complains Mr Li. “It makes us hostages, it restricts us as if we were slaves chained to the land.”

But files are not only abused as instruments in power struggles or vendettas. They can also become a commercial good, highlighting the problems of a society where everything can be for sale. Several graduates in the central town of Wubu in 2006 have discovered in the past three years that their files have disappeared, erasing bright prospects and condemning them to a future as day labourers or freelance salespeople.

The vanished files all belonged to students with exceptional grades, raising suspicions of identity theft. Officials in other provinces have been found to have sold files to wealthy families whose offspring wanted to improve their career chances. The common feature in such cases is that the victim is usually the last to find out there is a problem and frequently fails to discover what happened.

For Mr Zhu, everything went fine for the first 15 years at People’s Bank of China. The year 1979 was a hopeful one for China, and the 1980s were even better. The country was finally leaving the nightmare of the cultural revolution behind and initiating experiments in market economy.

Mr Zhu rose rapidly through the ranks. First he worked in gold and silver appraisal, and was made head of the Communist party youth league in that department. He began writing on finance in state media and, by 1991, he was working in ICBC headquarters in Beijing. In the course of this ascent, he says, he found himself in trouble with more than one supervisor over his ambitions. Following clashes with a boss whose authority he challenged, he says, he was told in 1994 seek a new employer. After two years of fighting to stay, he began writing for a state magazine. Five years in, he was fired from this position too.

His search for a new post took him to China International Intellectech Corporation, a state-owned human resources company. This is where the skies fell down on him. “They told me that even the documentation of how I entered the bank in 1979 wasn’t there [in my file],” says Mr Zhu. “I felt like my brain was imploding. Forget about the cadre status – without the proper documents, I was nothing, not even a worker. I would have no social security, my past 22-year working life would be erased.”

Mr Zhu convinced an official at ICBC to issue a note confirming the relevant material was lost and, on that basis, CIIC took him on – with the proviso that he must pay his own social security contributions because, according to CIIC, he lacked clear status as either a cadre or a worker.

In 2007, when he left CIIC, his file was transferred to the state human resources agency. When the agency found the note from the ICBC official, Mr Zhu was told it was not valid and he would have to find the original document proving when and how he entered the bank almost 30 years ago. He found a copy at the local archives office but it carried a stamp marking him as a “worker” – entitling him to lower social security benefits and making him ineligible for jobs he would want. Forms recording his cadre status, which he recalled filling in, were missing as well.

Mr Zhu has concluded that someone must be held responsible for the fact that he lost part of his pension. In February, he took ICBC to court, asking it to restore his cadre status and reimburse him for his Rmb22,133.61 ($3,000, £2,000, €2,300) in social security contributions. He lost, appealed and lost again. ICBC does not contest that items might be missing from his file but argues that it is not responsible because his employment at the bank ended 15 years ago. In court, its representatives said Mr Zhu should go after his other employers.

Next he petitioned all state departments that could possibly be responsible, all the way up to the state council’s legal department – to no avail. “Now all that’s left to do is go after ICBC’s shareholders,” he says. Last month Mr Zhu, who now survives by writing and broadcasting on finance, wrote to investors, including the ministry of finance and Goldman Sachs, but received no answer. The legal system, he believes, offers one more avenue: arbitration. His quest has made him a nervous wreck and this final step is unlikely to yield success.

Without full access to his own file, he still cannot prove what exactly brought his life crashing down around him, let alone where and when – which shows why the system is in dire need of reform, experts say. “The main problem is the secrecy,” says Prof Chen. But he is not optimistic that Beijing will allow more transparency any time soon. “There is just too much vested interest involved and there is the sense that the state must not cede this last key instrument of control over its people.”

Chinese wealth fund eyes Areva investment

China could soon make its presence felt in the French power sector as its sovereign wealth fund said it had studied investments in both Areva, the state-owned nuclear group, and its energy equipment division.

The China Investment Corporation has paid a visit to Areva executives in recent weeks to seek out information on “the business and its performance”, according to one person close to the company.

CIC has also asked for information on Areva T&D, the transmission and distribution division that was put on the block this summer. The unit, valued at between €3bn ($4.3bn) and €4bn, is one of the world’s leading suppliers of high and medium voltage power equipment and the CIC could be interested in taking a sizeable stake alongside another investor.

CIC’s interest in Areva, disclosed in the French daily Les Échos on Friday, follows the government’s decision earlier this year to sell at least 15 per cent of the group’s equity to industrial or strategic partners.

Paris has been talking to sovereign wealth funds from the Middle East and Asia about selling stakes under 5 per cent in Areva. The move, first reported in the Financial Times, is an effort by Paris to cement the group’s position in key emerging nuclear markets.

Areva’s Japanese partner, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, is also widely expected to take a stake.

However, a final decision on the opening of Areva’s share capital to outsiders is unlikely to be taken before the question of the T&D sale is resolved. Areva has been forced to put the business up for sale by its government shareholder in an effort to raise the €12bn it needs for future expansion and reduce the pressure for a capital increase.

Some 30 potential bidders have asked for the sale documents, including a second Chinese group, the low-voltage equipment maker, Chint Group of Wenzhou.

If Chint decides to bid by the September 18 deadline, it will find itself again in a battle with the French group Schneider Electric, which has joined Alstom of France to bid. In April, Schneider was ordered to pay Chint $23m to settle a patent lawsuit – at the time the largest recorded settlement in an intellectual property case in China.

Toshiba of Japan has also requested the sales memorandum and said that it is “watching with interest because the sale would change the dynamics of the industry”.

Toshiba would struggle to finance a bid. Despite a Y500bn ($5.37bn) capital raising in June, Toshiba’s equity amounts to only 20 per cent of total assets, its credit rating from Standard & Poor’s is BBB, and it must fund investment in both its semiconductor and nuclear power plant divisions.

Areva may also be reluctant to sell to one of its main rivals. Other interested parties include GE of the US and financial groups, including Axa Private Equity.

China’s long march to stock exchange stability

There is a rich vein to mine when searching for patterns and precedents that might help explain gyrations in western markets. Those searching for plausible parallels for this year’s bounce have travelled back as far as the Panic of 1907.

History, alas, is not much help when it comes to making sense of market movements in one of the world’s most ancient civilisations. China’s stock exchange – launched by communist rulers as a grudging experiment in the early 1990s – is a mere teenager, and often acts like one. It is a confused creature, prone to hormonal highs and lows, and occasionally frustrated by parental (read government) supervision that is too permissive one month, too strict the next.

China had a stock market before “liberation”, as the Chinese Communist party likes to call its triumph in 1949, but don’t look to that chaotic era for comparisons to explain the 20 per cent fall in Shanghai’s Composite index in the fortnight to August 19, after more than doubling over the previous nine months.

In a perhaps apocryphal comment, Zhu Rongji, the acerbic former Chinese premier, supposedly groused that in the good old days – roaring Shanghai circa the 1920s and 1930s – investors who lost everything would jump off rooftops, but now they protest outside government offices.

The party’s fear of investors at the gates is instructive. For China’s rulers, a plunging stock market is about as welcome as soaring inflation or unemployment. With 700,000 accounts being opened by new investors every week this summer, it would not be hard to organise a protest rally or two.

Fears of social instability aside, longer-term policy priorities also underlie the Chinese government’s desire to see the slide arrested.

As Jing Ulrich, chairman of China equities and commodities at JPMorgan, writes in a research note, market stability is important for goals including the first Shanghai listings of offshore Chinese companies (so-called “red chips”).

There is also a raft of initial public offerings to keep afloat. After a 10-month drought, China opened the floodgates this summer. Shanghai is top of this year’s issuance table, with $9.2bn in new offerings according to Dealogic.

As a result, league table-conscious bankers at brand-name western banks have had to surrender pride of place to China International Capital Corp, the mainland investment house and world’s leading bookrunner in 2009.

Market-management tools at the Chinese government’s disposal include liquidity adjustments by the central bank, more mutual fund launches and, when Beijing really needs a sledgehammer, a reduction in stamp duty.

They have been used before. In July 2005, a four-year 55 per cent slide was arrested just as the Shanghai Composite was poised to breach the psychologically important 1,000-point barrier.

Even by China’s standards, the resulting bounce was ridiculous. The index breached 6,000 in October 2007, then fell 72 per cent in just over a year.

These booms and busts have borne little rational relation to China’s underlying economic performance in the past decade. And with overseas participation restricted to carefully controlled quotas, the Shanghai stock market remains an overwhelmingly domestic affair. All of which begs the question – why should anyone else care about the Shanghai market’s increasingly violent ups and downs?

Yet care we do. Its shock daily falls this month have been reflexively cited for sympathetic movements in markets across the globe.

The argument for caring assumes that the Chinese investing public has, against all previous evidence, developed a mature insight into the workings of the broader macroeconomy.

After first-half bank lending exceeded the official full-year target, and then fell 77 per cent month on month in July, investors have supposedly taken fright at the implications for future economic growth.

Such a scenario would indeed be worth the rest of the world worrying about, especially with regard to the potential impact on global commodity prices.

Assuming that China’s juvenile market is growing up, and has reacted rationally to what has become a less rosy economic outlook, it could bode well for investors betting that this month’s fall heralds a correction rather than a crash.

Before this month’s market fall began in earnest, Vincent Chan and Peggy Chan at Credit Suisse noted that a retreat was overdue with China stocks trading at 22.5 times forward earnings compared with their long-term average of 17.64 times.

Fraser Howie at CLSA says: “All the market had in August is a reminder that the Chinese economy is not as strong as people think. It’s just a bit of a wake-up call.”

Source:FT

Beijing in vanguard of revolution as US dominion ends

China surprised this year when it overtook the US to become the biggest vehicle market, several years ahead of expectations.

Now Beijing plans to leapfrog a generation of automotive technology to lead the green car revolution.

Chinese vehicle makers rely heavily on foreign technology to produce internal combustion cars.

But Beijing is investing heavily in electric and other alternative technology, with the goal of exploiting Chinese cash, brains and central planning to jump ahead of older makers in the brave new world of environmentally friendly cars.

That is the kind of ambition that captures imaginations and headlines in the west, where the US’s century of dominance of the car industry has come to an ignominious end.

But is China really ready to lead the world to a greener automotive future?

When it comes to the next generation of alternative fuel vehicles, everyone agrees that much will depend on the government.

“China could be the country that leads the world in switching to electric vehicles,” says Kevin Wale, China head of GM, which plans to sell its Volt hybrid electric car in China.

But Chery, a leading Chinese maker which is also developing electric and hybrid-electric vehicles, says such cars are “very expensive without government help” in the form of direct buyer subsidies.

“China appears to be serious about going electric,” says Mike Dunne, motor analyst at JD Power, the consultancy, in Shanghai.

In February, Beijing said its target was 5 per cent of “new energy vehicles” by 2011, and in April it announced $8,000 subsidies for buying electric vehicles and investment in car battery charging stations in some cities.

“The major hitch continues to be price,” says Mr Dunne. “Even with subsidy, buyers need to pay a premium for electrics.”

He points out that only 899 Prius hybrid cars were sold in China last year.

“That just puts things in perspective.”

Yale Zhang of CSM, the consultancy in Shanghai, says infrastructure is vital.

Electric car recharging stations will be important in a country where so few people have garages with electric outlets.

In cities such as Shanghai, where the limited range of such vehicles might make them an attractive choice, most people live in high rise flats. Carrying a car battery up 10 or 20 floors, even in a lift, might not be appealing.

Warren Buffett, the US investor, is so confident of the future of China’s electric cars that he has bought a 10 per cent stake in BYD, the battery-turned-car group hoping to be at the forfront of China’s electric car revolution.

BYD has started selling hybrid electric cars in some markets in China.

CHINA STIMULUS RISKS DAMAGING DEVELOPMENT

China’s much-vaunted stimulus package has exacerbated structural imbalances in the economy and may delay the country’s transition to a more sustainable growth model, according to some leading economists.

Most analysts regard the Rmb4,000bn ($585bn, €410bn, £355bn) plan, unveiled in November, as an appropriate response to the crisis and say it pulled the economy out of what could have been a much deeper slump.

However, as the effects of the stimulus fade, some now say the response was too aggressive and that the government’s focus on an unprecedented credit expansion and a massive infrastructure boost has aggravated the country’s stark economic imbalances.

“The economy’s structural problems have been made worse by the stimulus programme,” Wang Yijiang, a professor of economics at the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business in Beijing, told the Financial Times.

He pointed to resurgent asset bubbles in the stock and property markets and the fact that most of the stimulus had gone to the state sector, while smaller private enterprises, which create the most jobs, had been left largely to fend for themselves.

“The stimulus package was a response to a crisis rather than aimed at rebalancing China’s growth model,” said Jonathan Woetzel, a director in McKinsey’s Shanghai office. “In the short term, Beijing’s stimulus and monetary policy are perpetuating the imbalances.”

A report published today by the McKinsey Global Institute points out that 89 per cent of the entire stimulus package is devoted to infrastructure investment such as roads and railways, while just 8 per cent is allocated to supporting consumption.

Private consumption in China has declined sharply as a share of overall GDP since the mid-1980s, accounting for only 36 per cent – the lowest ratio of any major economy, reflecting China’s reliance on investment as its main growth driver.

“Today’s low consumption share is systemic, and China will not be able to tackle this issue without comprehensive reform that includes structural change,” says the report.

“China’s economic growth profile has been very employment-light and there is a need to rebalance investment away from the traditional emphasis on heavy industry and infrastructure towards smaller, private enterprises, especially in the services sector,” said Mr Woetzel.

Investors take heart as Shanghai bounces back

A powerful rebound for Chinese stocks offered an encouraging backdrop for global equity markets yesterday, although the broader risk environment was more mixed.

The Shanghai Composite index leapt 4.5 per cent – its biggest one-day rise since March – amid hopes of government action to support the market following its slide since the start of the month.

“China is currently being watched as a bellwether with concerns that the recent collapse in Chinese equities may act as a leading indicator for global equities,” said Sreekala Kochugovindan, asset allocation strategist at Barclays Capital.

“However, the latest bout of risk aversion has occurred against the backdrop of low volumes. History suggests that trends established during periods of low trading volumes have swiftly petered out once volumes picked up.”

Shanghai’s advance helped other Asian equity markets rebound, with the Nikkei 225 in Tokyo rising 1.8 per cent and Hong Kong 1.9 per cent.

Europe followed suit, with the FTSE Eurofirst 300 gaining 1.4 per cent, while the S&P 500 was up 0.8 per cent by midday in New York.

US investors focused on the positives in what turned out to be a fairly mixed bag of economic releases. “It seems that more so than ever each trickle of data has even greater meaning attached to it at present,” said Andrew Wilkinson, senior market analyst at Interactive Brokers.

“That’s probably due to the growing wariness over whether the patchwork quilt sewn together by government and central banks is sufficient to warm the consumer until artificial demand can be adequately replaced by genuine consumer demand.”

China acts to reduce health bills

China has moved to control healthcare costs from Beijing for its citizens, setting plans to purchase and distribute hundreds of essential medicines that are now mostly sold at huge mark-up prices through hospital pharmacies.

The measures are part of an Rmb850bn ($124bn, €88bn, £75bn) overhaul of the country’s ailing health system, aimed at securing basic medical services for every citizen and increasing efficiency and transparency in drug use.

When Beijing began reforming its communist economy 30 years ago it discontinued free healthcare for all and, by 2000, the majority of the population was uninsured. Although the authorities have since tried to build a new healthcare system, large numbers of rural residents and migrant workers still cannot afford healthcare.

“By 2003, 30 per cent of poor households in the government’s National Health Survey were reporting healthcare costs as the main cause of their poverty,” the World Bank said in a report on health reform in China this year.

The World Bank said misaligned incentives encouraged hospitals to make money from selling drugs. China’s share of pharmaceutical expenditure relative to total health expenditure was nearly 45 per cent in 2003, compared with an OECD average of about 15 per cent.

Beijing has pledged to decouple hospital revenues from pharmaceuticals sales. “The essential drugs used in government clinics will be purchased centrally through government-controlled institutions, to be picked by provincial governments,” the health ministry said in guidelines published this week. Other clinics would also have to buy these medicines through similar mechanisms.

Beijing said that, under the essential drug system, patients could receive their medicine from independent pharmacies with a prescription from a doctor. The government added that it would set prices for the listed drugs, with adjustments every three years. It aims to get 30 per cent of all grassroots health institutions – small, mostly rural clinics – on board this year.

Analysts said much remained unclear as the list published this week only covered grassroots clinics and medicines for basic treatment of common illnesses, including aspirin and some antibiotics.

“Now we know that demand for the drugs that made it on to the list is certain to increase, but the key point of how prices are to be set hasn’t been addressed yet,” said Zhang Yin, an analyst at Bank of China International.

He added that there were clear benefits for producers of traditional Chinese medicines, because the traditional remedies on the list were mostly proprietary products, so suppliers would face no competition. The western drugs on the list are almost all compounds available in generic form.

Architects win Chinese banking projects

RMJM, one of the world’s biggest architectural practices, has won a slew of design commissions from state-owned Chinese banks.

Eighteen months ago the UK-based group won the contract to design a 200-metre high headquarters for China Merchants Bank on Shanghai’s Bund, which is under construction.

This was RMJM’s first banking project in China, though the group designed the convention centre for the Beijing Olympics and employs 150 architects in Hong Kong.

But it has also won three more design contracts in China – to build a stock exchange and headquarters for the securities arm of China Merchants Bank in Shenzhen, a 250,000-square-metre credit card centre for the same bank in Chengdu and a headquarters for the Ningbo Construction Bank in its home city.

David Pringle, RMJM’s director for Asia and the Middle East, said this investment reflected a desire by Chinese banks to expand their operations into areas such as credit cards and telephone and internet banking.

Mr Pringle said his Edinburgh-based firm – with more than 1,000 staff in 16 offices round the world – had seen “absolutely no slowdown” in work in China.

In July RMJM relocated its Asia-Pacific headquarters in Hong Kong, moving from a city centre corporate tower to a former warehouse in Quarry Bay, on the island’s eastern side.

The group said it expected activity levels in this part of the world would be in excess of its pre-recession peak within a matter of months, and predicted it would be under pressure to recruit staff.

Chinese activist arrested for tax evasion

Xu Zhiyong, a Chinese legal scholar and aid campaigner, has been formally arrested on tax evasion charges, in the latest step in Beijing’s crackdown on legal activists.

Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, where Mr Xu teaches law, was notified of his official arrest, said Zhou Ze, Mr Xu’s lawyer. “This letter was received,” said a colleague of Mr Xu’s who asked not to be identified.

Under China’s opaque legal system, it is unclear whether Mr Xu will be prosecuted. But his formal arrest makes it more likely that he will go to trial. As a leading proponent of legal reform in China, his case could serve as a test for how committed Beijing is to continue developing the rule of law.

Mr Xu was taken away from his home at dawn on July 29 shortly after the government closed down the Open Constitution Initiative, a non-governmental group co-founded and run by him which provides legal assistance in public interest cases.

The centre was closed after the authorities fined the group Rmb1.4m, saying it had failed to pay its taxes. Mr Xu’s detention came a day before he was due for a hearing on that case.

Mr Xu became widely known in 2003 when he campaigned against China’s extralegal detention of people staying in a city they lack a residential permit for. Mr Xu called upon the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament, to check whether the system was constitutional after Sun Zhigang, a university graduate, died following a beating while in police custody. Later that year, that form of detention was abolished.

Since then, Mr Xu has taken on numerous public interest cases. Most recently, his centre’s lawyers represented parents of children who died or fell ill after consuming melamine-tainted milk powder.

If found guilty of tax evasion, Mr Xu could face a sentence of up to seven years. Lawyers working with the centre said the tax evasion charges were part of Beijing’s broader attempt to harass activist lawyers and legal aid groups.

Open Constitution was set up as a company because aid groups that try to register as nonprofits often face insurmountable administrative hurdles in China. However, the alternative exposes them to government demands to declare tax as a for-profit business.

Earlier this month, centre organizers called for public donations and tried to settle the fine. However, they said this proved difficult because tax authorities refused to issue necessary paperwork and the bank accounts of the centre and Mr Xu were frozen.

Mr Zhou said he was allowed to visit Mr Xu late last week in a Beijing detention facility where Mr Xu remained as of Tuesday.

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